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Something to [Lex Loci] Celebrationis?:
Federal Marriage Benefits
Following United States v. Windsor
by MEG PENROSE*
The critical issue the Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA") resolves is: who decides? Who decides
whether, when, and to what extent same-sex marriages
created in one American state will be recognized by
other state governments, and by the federal
government? That structural issue is the most
important issue at stake in the controversy about
interstate recognition of same-sex marriage in the
United States. It is a question legal proceduralists and
legal structuralists-such as conflict of laws scholars-
can, should, and largely do understand and appreciate.
The structural matters of respect for the constitutional
allocation of government, and adherence to legitimate
processes to decide important issues are at least as
important-and are probably even more important to
our nation's legal system-as the very significant
substantive policies concerning same-sex marriage and
inter-jurisdictional recognition of same-sex marriage.'
* Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law. Professor Penrose would like
to thank interim Dean Aric Short, Professor Huyen Pham, and Texas A&M University
School of Law for graciously providing the resources to support faculty scholarship.
Professor Penrose would like to additionally thank Professors Pat Cain and Robin
Fretwell-Wilson for their thoughtful comments and input. Finally, Professor Penrose
would like to thank her many colleagues that improved this piece by attending and
participating in the Texas A&M University School of Law Faculty Scholar Series in
August, 2013.
1. Lynn D. Wardle, Who Decides? The Federal Architecture of DOMA and
Comparative Marriage Recognition, 41 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 143, 143-144 (2010).
[41]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Introduction: Not Who Decides, But Who Is Married?
Americans love weddings. Each year, Americans spend
hundreds of millions of dollars on wedding celebrations.2 Hotels.
Churches. Receptions. Marriage is about more than love. Marriage
is also about money. The revenue generating potential of marriage is
what ultimately convinced New York State to allow same-sex couples
to legally marry. For New York, the question came down to dollars
and sense, not politics. New York is purportedly hundreds of millions
of dollars wealthier because of this decision.3
2. PHILLY.COM reported on the massive economic benefits (and losses) that attend
same-sex marriage issues, including those relating to tourism. See Jeff Gammage, Another
Reason Backers Say PA Should Legalize Gay Marriage: $$$, PHILLY.COM (July 16, 2013,
1:07 AM), http://articles.philly.com/2013-07-16/news/40592292-1-gay-marriage-limited-
marriage-lee-badgett. Gammage reports that:
In New York City, officials say the first full year of legal same-sex
marriage brought $16 million in direct revenue to the city, among $259
million in economic impact for hotels, restaurants, caterers, and
wedding suppliers.
The 8,200 same-sex marriage licenses issued between July 2011 and
2012 represented more than 10 percent of 75,000 total licenses. For
those gay weddings, 200,000 guests traveled to the five boroughs from
outside the city, booking 235,000 hotel-room nights at an average daily
rate of $275, according to a study released by Mayor Michael
Bloomberg and City Council Speaker Christine Quinn.
Other states see similar windfalls--or watch them pass, according to
the Williams Institute, an arm of the UCLA Law School that studies
gender-identity law and policy. It found:
In Washington state, same-sex marriage should generate $88 million
during the next three years, including $5 million in additional tax
revenue in the first year.
Texas loses out on about $60 million a year in wedding-related
revenue, due to its ban on gay marriage.
Maryland same-sex couples will spend an estimated $63 million on
weddings in the next three years.
"It's big," said Lee Badgett, the institute research director and a
professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
"Many couples who want to get married, it's a special day, so they
spend lots of money. They invite friends and family, and they spend
lots of money."
3. Blake Ellis, Gay Marriage Boosts NYCs Economy by $259 Million in First Year,
CNN MONEY (July 24, 2012, 6:01 PM) http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/24/pf/gay-marriage-
economic-impact/index.htm. Ellis reports that:
More than 200,000 guests flocked to New York City from other parts
of the state or country to partake in the celebrations. Hotels booked
nearly 236,000 nights at an average rate of $275 per night. More than
40,000 wedding announcements were printed, and couples bought
47,445 wedding favors, the economic impact survey found.
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Many same-sex couples have flocked to New York and its "gay-
friendly" hotels to tie the knot. For these couples, the decision to
marry likewise carries (usually beneficial) financial consequences.
Same-sex jurisdictions celebrate the fact that tourism, for "destination
wedding" purposes, is up.4 Same-sex couples celebrate the fact that
they, too, can now marry. But, what happens when these same-sex
couples return home to a state that does not recognize their
marriage?' Or, worse yet, what happens when individuals living in
New York get married in New York but then move to a state where
their marriage is not recognized?6 Is marital status portable? Is
marital status dissolvable merely through travel? Who-for federal
purposes-is legally married?
This is the new question relating to same sex marriage.! Not
"who decides," but who is married.' Not what marriage should be,
but what marriage is-federally speaking.9
4. Further evidence of New York's appreciation for this tourism boom is the July,
2013 decision of New York state Comptroller, Thomas DiNapoli. DiNapoli:
is using the power of the state's $160 billion pension system to urge
President Barack Obama to order federal agencies and programs
around the country to recognize gay marriages performed in New
York.
DiNapoli's idea is to adopt a "place of celebration" standard in federal
government, meaning gay marriages that take place in New York
would be recognized even in states that do not permit them. It could
be a big push in DiNapoli's effort to get major companies that do
business with the state pension fund to adopt anti-discrimination
measures when providing benefits for gay couples.
Michael Gormley, NY Official Pushes Feds to Recognize Gay Marriages, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (July 19, 2013, 1:02 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ny-official-pushes-feds-
recognize-gay-marriages.
5. It is important to note that this article makes no distinction between "migratory"
and "evasive" marriages. Migratory marriages are those where the couple is domiciled in
state where their marriage is legal and, thereafter, leaves the state. In contrast, "evasive"
marriages are those marriages where an individual intentionally leaves their domicile to
evade their home state's laws relating to marriage. Conflicts of law provisions have
routinely distinguished between migratory and evasive marriages. This author, however,
believes that while the distinction between migratory and evasive marriage is relevant to
state recognition issues, the distinction is not relevant to the question of federal
recognition.
6. See, e.g., Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex
Marriage, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1421,1423-24 (2012).
7. See Cozen O'Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, Civ. Action No.11-0045, 2013 WL 3878688
(E.D. Pa. July 29, 2013). Within weeks of the Supreme Court's 2013 ruling in United States
v. Windsor extending federal tax benefits to the surviving spouse in a same-sex marriage, a
similar action was filed by a surviving same-sex spouse in Pennsylvania seeking retirement
benefits under ERISA, a federal law. Relying on Windsor, the federal district court found
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This article attempts to give a very simple and direct answer to
the question: who should be considered married for federal law
purposes? The federal government and many states have historically
relied on the-place-of-celebration rule, or the Latin "lex loci
celebrationis," to determine who is married."o Reliance on lex loci
celebrationis ensures that married couples do not lose their marital
status simply because they travel across state borders or relocate to a
new home. Under lex loci celebrationis, if the marriage is legally valid
where it was celebrated, then the marriage is legally valid everywhere
else and for all purposes. This recognition continues even in states
where the marriage could not have been originally performed.
The United States government has not spoken with a single voice
regarding its reaction to United States v. Windsor. Instead, in
piecemeal fashion, various federal agencies are beginning to
announce who is considered married for certain federal purposes.
The Office of Personnel Management quickly embraced lex loci
celebrationis, indicating in a July 2013 advisory letter that federal
benefits "[c]overage is available to a legally married same-sex spouse
of a Federal employee or annuitant, regardless of his or her state of
residency." The Department of Defense followed suit in August
2013, affirming the military will embrace the place-of-celebration
rule. The Department of Defense went further, though, in declaring
its policy to provide same-sex couples with ten days of nonchargeable
leave to enable such couples equal opportunity to reap the military's
many marital benefits. Most recently, in late August 2013, the
Internal Revenue Service confirmed that it, too, will follow lex loci
celebrationis.11
in favor of the surviving spouse even though the defendant company was not located in a
state recognizing same-sex marriage. Id. at 9-12.
8. This question may unintentionally call to mind the infamous quote of former
President William Jefferson Clinton when he explained, "[i]t depends on what your
definition of 'is' is."
9. See Cozen O'Connor, P.C. v. Tobits, Civ. Action No. 11-0045, 2013 WL 3878688,
at *10-12 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2013) (considering the definition of "spouse" for federal law
purposes).
10. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 8 (1996) (noting "[t]he general rule for
determining the validity of a marriage is lex celebrationis-that is, a marriage is valid if it is
valid according to the law of the place where it was celebrated.").
11. Treasury and IRS Announce that all Legal Same-Sex Marriages Will be
Recognized for Federal Tax Purposes (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uaclNewsroom/
Treasury-and-IRS-Announce-That-All-Legal-Same-Sex-Marriages-Will-Be-Recognized-
For-Federal-Tax-Purposes;-Ruling-Provides-Certainty,-Benefits-and-Protections-Under-
Federal-Tax-Law-for-Same-Sex-Married-Couples. The IRS ruling explains:
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One might expect, or even hope, that all federal agencies will
embrace this same expansive approach. But, such pronouncement is
not a direct by-product of United States v. Windsor. The question of
who is married, for federal purposes, becomes even more complicated
now that the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned, in a very
narrowly drafted opinion, certain same-sex marriages for federal
purposes. 12  Whether all same-sex marriages fall within Windsor's
grace is unclear. Currently, thirteen states and the District of
Columbia recognize same-sex marriage.13 The Court's opinion in
United States v. Windsor did not provide a universal definition of
marriage or clarity regarding which marriages will be federally
recognized. Rather, Windsor only held that those individuals married
in a jurisdiction recognizing same-sex marriage and currently living in
a state that recognizes same-sex marriage are entitled to have their
marriage federally recognized.14 In this respect, Windsor raised far
more questions than it answered.
These lingering questions retain constitutional dimensions even
though federal agencies are beginning to speak. Marriage, and its
attendant benefits, should not be susceptible to varying agency
pronouncements. Rather, as Justice Kennedy makes clear in
Windsor, the question of who is entitled to federal marriage benefits
invokes liberty and equal protection concerns. Regardless of how
federal agencies answer the question of marriage entitlement,
anything less than a constitutional statement is contingent on future
The U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) today ruled that same-sex couples, legally married in
jurisdictions that recognize their marriages, will be treated as married
for federal tax purposes. The ruling applies regardless of whether the
couple lives in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage or a
jurisdiction that does not recognize same-sex marriage.
The ruling implements federal tax aspects of the June 26 Supreme
Court decision invalidating a key provision of the 1996 Defense of
Marriage Act.
Under this ruling, same-sex couples will be treated as married for all
federal tax purposes, including income and gift and estate taxes. The
ruling applies to all federal tax provisions where marriage is a factor,
including filing status, claiming personal and dependency exemptions,
taking the standard deduction, employee benefits, contributing to an
IRA and claiming the earned income tax credit or child tax credit.
12. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2013).
13. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, Washington and the District of Columbia. Minnesota
and Rhode Island are the two most recent states to legalize same-sex marriage, with both
states' laws taking effect August 1, 2013.
14. Windsor, slip op. at 1-26.
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agency pronouncements and changes in presidential administrations.
The question "Who is married for federal purposes?" undoubtedly
remains a viable, and urgent, constitutional question.
This article addresses the most pressing unresolved question of
Windsor: Will the federal government use the morphing and varied
state definitions of marriage to assess which couples are legally
married, or will it use a singular federal criterion, such as lex loci
celebrations, for evaluating marriage when it comes to determining
federal burdens and benefits? Resort to any paradigm excepting "the
place of celebration" carries serious constitutional consequences. If
same-sex marriages are evaluated federally under guidelines distinct
from opposite-sex marriages, an equal protection challenge looms
large." If federal recognition of same-sex marriages depends on
remaining in a state that sanctions same-sex unions, the constitutional
right to travel is impaired. These looming constitutional questions
can easily be resolved by relying on lex loci celebrationis to determine
who, for federal purposes, is married.
Section I provides a brief explanation of the Court's holding in
Windsor. Section II discusses lex loci celebrationis, the tradition of
recognizing a marriage if the marriage was legal where it was
originally celebrated." Section III addresses the lingering
constitutional implications following Windsor, including whether the
Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause protects all legally wed
same-sex couples, or only those living in same-sex jurisdictions; and
whether the fundamental right to travel protects those legally
performed even after the couple leaves that jurisdiction. The natural
extension of Windsor requires adoption of the lex loci celebrationis
definition of marriage for federal purposes. Because the federal
government has chosen to recognize some same-sex marriages, any
variation among this class of marriages will be subject to
constitutional scrutiny either under equal protection or the
constitutional right to travel. While Windsor stopped abruptly short
of granting a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, Justice
15. To be clear, this article does not address those opposite-sex marriages that have
been traditionally condemned by both state and federal courts, including cases involving
bigamy, incest or polygamy. While some authors, and jurists, conflate these long-
prohibited marriages with the same-sex question, same-sex marriages do not have the
same pedigree of condemnation, legally, as bigamous, incestuous and polygamous
marriages. See e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (unanimous opinion).
16. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 121 (1934) (The Restatement
deemed a marriage "valid everywhere" if the "requirements of the marriage law of the
state where the contract of marriage" occurred were satisfied.).
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Kennedy's majority opinion undoubtedly opened the door for federal
recognition of all same-sex marriages. Americans uniquely possess
two forms of citizenship-state and federal. States are
constitutionally justified in defining for themselves who can be
married within their borders. Windsor does not alter this power.
Instead, Windsor implicates concepts of federal citizenship when it
asks which couples are married for federal purposes.
Adopting the place-of-celebration rule does not force the larger,
and far more controversial, substantive due process issue" and it still
provides states with the right to choose which marriages they will
recognize. Using lex loci celebrationis enables the federal government
to treat all citizens equally for federal marital purposes without
implicating federalism, equal protection or constitutional right to
travel concerns. Now that Windsor has advanced the gay marriage
issue, potentially implicating some measure of federal constitutional
protection for same-sex couples, perhaps there is finally something
for same-sex couples to (lex loci) celebrationis.
I. The Winds[or] Change
The threatening conditions that caused Congress to
enact DOMA fourteen years ago-to protect state and
congressional authority to decide the marriage
recognition question for their own sovereign
jurisdictions-have not disappeared, but are instead
more threatening than ever. No state had yet legalized
same-sex marriage in 1996; today, five states and the
District of Columbia have legalized same-sex marriage.
Therefore, those six jurisdictions create same-sex
marriages that are exported to other states (when same-
sex couples move from one state to another). Further,
in 1996, no American court had yet ruled that same-sex
marriages performed in one state had to be recognized
17. Under Justice Scalia's prediction, full-fledged gay marriage is but a constitutional
season or two away. See Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia predicts that Lawrence's "reasoning leaves on
pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples." Id. at 601.
Justice Scalia returns to the gay marriage issue a few pages later when he admonishes, "At
the end of its opinion-after having laid waste the foundations of our rational-basis
jurisprudence-the Court says the present case 'does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to
enter. . . .' Do not believe it." Id. at 604.
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in another. Today, over a dozen United States courts
have ruled that same-sex marriages created elsewhere
must be recognized by their respective state laws. Thus,
as a matter of constitutional structure and procedure,
DOMA is needed today more than ever before.18
This paragraph was published in 2010." The author's concerns
have grown more acute as 14 jurisdictions have now sanctioned same-
sex marriage.2 Further, state courts are increasingly accepting the
need to legally recognize same-sex marriages for family law
purposes.21 The Supreme Court's Windsor opinion acknowledged the
need to embrace the legality of same-sex marriage where that
marriage was both legal where performed and legal where the couple
was domiciled.' But, the Court did not address the exportation
issue.'
On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court issued two opinions
addressing same-sex marriage.2 4 In neither case did the Court render
a transformative decision granting a federal constitutional right to
same-sex marriage." Rather, in Windsor, the lone case where the
18. Lynn D. Wardel, Who Decides? The Federal Architecture of DOMA and
Comparative Marriage Recognition, 41 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 143,177-78 (2010).
19. Id.
20. Sanders, supra note 3, at 1439 ("Legally, politically, and culturally, same-sex
marriage has gone mainstream").
21. See Alexander Maugeri, The Missing Ingredient: How Oft-Overlooked Modern
Conflict of Laws Principles Will Dictate the Reach of Same-Sex Marriage in America, 30
ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 325,329 (2011). Maugeri writes:
[S]tate courts will decide a multiplicity of choice of law cases in which
same-sex litigants seek to have a particular benefit, right, or amalgam
of rights associated with their domestic partnership, civil union, or
marriage granted recognition and legal effect by states other than the
one that celebrated their legal relationship.
These controversies are sure to arise because of the diversity of state policies toward
conferring these statuses and benefits, as well as the diversity of statutory and state
constitutional rules for the recognition of foreign same-sex statuses. (emphasis in original).
22. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 17 (U.S. June 26, 2013).
23. Id. at 1-26.
24. Windsor, slip op. at 1; Hollingsworth v. Perry, No. 12-144, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June
26, 2013).
25. The Court returned Perry to the lower court, essentially reinstating the federal
district court's opinion, based on the majority's finding that the Court lacked standing. It
is noteworthy that both gay marriage cases provided lengthy discussions relating to
standing and justiciability. Avoiding the merits of such controversial and heated issues is
not, however, foreign to the Court. See DeFunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974)
(dismissing an educational affirmative action case on mootness grounds).
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Court addressed the constitutional merits of same-sex marriage, the
Court found Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA")
unconstitutional.26
A. DOMA
DOMA-a federal statute passed in 1996-limited recognition of
marriage to "a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife." 27  The impetus behind DOMA was to prevent
Hawaii, the first state to declare same-sex marriage a legal right, from
setting a national requirement to recognize same-sex marriages as
valid for benefit purposes under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.2
DOMA was a directive to forego the traditional application of the
place-of-celebration rule and, instead, cabin marital recognition-
solely for same-sex marriages-to a new and distinct standard.
Through DOMA, Congress declared that the Constitution's Full
Faith and Credit Clause would not apply for same-sex marriages.2 9
DOMA was remarkable in both its breadth and purpose. For the first
time in our history, the federal government-not the individual
states-was defining marriage and declaring which marriages could
be recognized."o The only prior attempts to prevent certain marriages
26. Windsor, slip op. at 25.
27. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
28. See Background and Need for Legislation, Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"),
H.R. REP. No 104-664, at 2 (1996) (acknowledging that DOMA "is a response to a very
particular development in the State of Hawaii").
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 C (1996).
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
30. Id.; 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.
See also Mary Margaret Penrose, Unbreakable Vows: Same-Sex Marriage and the
Fundamental Right to Divorce, 58 VILL. L. REv. 169, 174-77 (2013) (The only prior
attempts to federally define or constitutional marriage were the various attempts to outlaw
interracial marriages.).
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were the failed attempts to federally legislate and constitutionalize
the prohibition of interracial marriage."
For years, DOMA ensured that any same-sex couple seeking
federal recognition of their marriage would be denied the more than
1,000 federal benefits attributed to married couples. 2  When Edith
Windsor challenged the IRS's refusal to consider her a surviving
spouse-a decision that resulted in her being charged $363,000 in
estate taxes that were not charged to surviving spouses in opposite-
sex couples-DOMA fell. As the Windsor decision made clear, the
federal benefits attending marriage carry serious constitutional
consequences.
B. Windsor Puts an End to DOMA
The Windsor majority found DOMA "unconstitutional as a
deprivation of the liberty of the person protected by the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution."33 The opinion vacillated, however,
between the liberty component and the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment by interchanging liberty (suggesting
substantive due process protection) and equality verbiage.' Justice
Kennedy's opinion did not clearly identify the constitutional standard
of review utilized, whether it was intermediate scrutiny usually
applied to gender cases35 or strict scrutiny reserved for suspect classes
such as race or national origin.3 6 The opinion can be fairly criticized
for its opaque review standard finding DOMA invalid, "for no
legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage
31. Id.
32. Penrose, supra note 29, at 169. See also, Maugeri, supra note 20, at 335
(observing that DOMA "specifies that the terms 'marriage' and 'spouse' in the U.S. Code
only pertain to unions between a man and a woman; its effect is that the thousands of legal
incidents conferred on traditional spouses are not extended for the purposes of federal law
to those individuals in civil unions or same-sex marriages").
33. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 25 (U.S. June 26, 2013).
34. Id. The Court proclaims both that Windsor's liberty and equality has been
violated in three consecutive paragraphs. One wonders whether such presentation is
intentionally confusing or merely careless. Constitutionally speaking, the presentation is
undoubtedly lacking in precision.
35. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (the seminal sex discrimination case
establishing an intermediate or "mid-tier" level of constitutional scrutiny).
36. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 218-227 (1995) ("[W]e
hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local
government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other
words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures
that further compelling governmental interests.").
50 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 41:1
Fall 2013] SOMETHING TO [LEX LOCI] CELEBRA TIONIS?
and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to
protect in personhood and dignity."37
This language suggests "rational basis," the lowest standard of
constitutional review and least searching level of constitutional
scrutiny." Laws evaluated under rational basis are generally found
constitutional because all that is required is a legitimate governmental
purpose." In fact, under traditional rational basis review, courts
generally sustain legislation, even aiding governmental entities
seeking to defend a particular law.' If the governmental actor is
unable to provide a rational basis for its legislative classification,
courts using true rational basis review will proffer hypothetical
reasons of its own that suffice to uphold the law.4'
The other form of "rational basis" review, and the form that has
been seemingly applied by the Supreme Court in previous "gay
rights" cases, is "rational basis plus." Rational basis plus upholds
legislative classifications unless the Court believes the classification is
based on animus or a desire to cause harm to an unpopular group.42
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Windsor expanded his past
writings in Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas.43 Throughout the
majority opinion the Court expressed concern that "[tihe avowed
purpose and practical effect of [DOMA] are to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and a stigma upon all who enter into
same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of the
[individual] States.""
37. Windsor, slip op. at 25-26.
38. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
39. Id. at 488 ("It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.").
40. Id. at 487 (observing that the legislature "might have concluded that the
frequency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify this
regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses").
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
43. Id. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Romer indicates that the Colorado
Amendment struck down was constitutionally deficient for at least two reasons: First, the
amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability
on a single named group, an exceptional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of
legislation. Second, its sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it
that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class; it lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests. Id.
44. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 21 (U.S. June 26,2013).
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The majority in Windsor further rebuked DOMA for
"interfer[ing] with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages" 45 and
advancing an apparent principal purpose "to impose inequality"" on
same-sex couples without justification. Justice Kennedy's opinion
condemned the federal government's two-tiered approach toward
marriage, noting that only one version qualified for federal
recognition and benefits. 47 However, whether Windsor followed past
precedence in applying "rational basis plus" evaluation to same-sex
rights is not the focus of this article. Rather, this article seeks to
answer the simple question: Who is married for federal law purposes?
The constitutional level of scrutiny implicated by the underlying
question of whether same-sex marriage is constitutional is distinct
from why the federal government must adopt the place-of-celebration
rule for assessing same-sex marriage. Failure to adopt lex loci
celebrationis will undoubtedly result in future litigation under the
equal protection and constitutional right to travel doctrines. In other
words, perhaps the more important obscurity of Windsor is its failure
to clearly articulate that the decision applies to all same-sex
marriages, like Edith Windsor's, that were legal at the place of
celebration.
The hallmark of the "gay rights" cases has been remarkably
constrained rulings. In all three cases where the Court has extended
protections to members of the gay community, Justice Kennedy has
written the majority opinion." In each case, the majority opinions
have advanced the right as narrowly as possible, indicating that the
Court is not yet ready to constitutionalize a federal right to marriage49
45. Id
46. Id. at 22.
47. Id. at 22-23.
48. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003);
United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. (U.S. June 26, 2013).
49. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Distinguishing Lawrence from Bowers v. Hardwick,
the case directly overruled by Lawrence, Justice Kennedy clearly outlined what the case
was not about:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not be easily refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter.
Justice O'Connor echoed Justice Kennedy's cautious approach in her concurring opinion.
Id. at 584-85.
52 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 41:1
Fall 20131 SOMETHING TO [LEX LOCII CELEBRA TIONIS?
as previously occurred for interracial couples in Loving v. Virginia.o
Justice Scalia has been quick to criticize Justice Kennedy for his lack
of clarity, if not fidelity, to constitutional review and applications of
constitutional levels of scrutiny in each of these three cases."
Rather than critique the opinion for its constitutional
ambiguity,52 this author attempts to resolve the critical issue Windsor
leaves unanswered. The question-what qualifies as a marriage for
federal law purposes-demands attention and will likely drive future
same-sex marriage cases. Litigants that participated in marriages in a
state, or country, where same-sex marriage was legal will want the
same federal protections that Windsor received. Litigants will want
access to the more than 1,000 federal benefits that some same-sex
couples-those like Windsor who married (and lives in) a jurisdiction
that allows same-sex marriage-are now constitutionally entitled to
receive.
While Windsor clearly extended federal marital benefits (and
burdens)" to persons whose marriage is lawful both within the lex loci
celebrationis' and the lex loci domicilii," Windsor actively sidestepped
the follow-up and, perhaps, more critical question of whether federal
50. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
51. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 15 (U.S. June 26, 2013) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the "rootless and shifting" nature of the majority's justifications
for its holding in Windsor). "The sum of all the Court's nonspecific hand-waving is that
this law is invalid (maybe on equal-protection grounds, maybe on substantive-due-process
grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous federalism playing a role) . .." Id. at 18. The
majority opinion notes the criminal law protections, bankruptcy, taxes, health care, and
ethics issues that lawfully married same-sex couples are denied under DOMA. United
States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 23 (U.S. June 26, 2013).
52. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 7-17 (U.S. June 26, 2013) (Alito,
J., dissenting). Justice Alito fairly suggests that, "[p]erhaps because they cannot show that
same-sex marriage is a fundamental right under our Constitution, Windsor and the United
States couch their arguments in equal protection terms." But, ultimately, the Court's
majority fails to resolve this question or clearly express on what basis the decision is being
rendered.
53. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 23-24 (U.S. June 26, 2013)
(noting that "DOMA divests married same-sex couples of the duties and responsibilities
that are an essential part of married life and that they, in most cases, would be honored to
accept were DOMA not in force").
54. "[T]he law of the place where a contract, esp. of marriage is made." MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionaryllex%20loci%20celebrationis (last
visited Sept. 7, 2013). Literally meaning the law of the place of the ceremony. The Oxford
Reference defines this phrase as "[t]he law of the place of celebration of marriage."
OXFORDREFERENCE.COM, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oilauthority.2O
110803100103412 (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
55. Literally, the place of domicile.
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marital benefits (and burdens) extend to same-sex couples married,
but not domiciled, in a state where same-sex marriage is lawfully
recognized. These marriages were certainly legal when performed.
Does leaving the marital state legally eviscerate the union? Is it
possible that a couple is married in New York, no longer married
while driving through New Jersey, legal again for the drive through
Delaware and Maryland, but not legal when arriving home in
Virginia?
This convoluted scenario demonstrates the dilemma faced by
same-sex couples partaking in a "destination wedding""-a situation
never faced by opposite-sex couples.5 ' The same uncertainty
regarding marital status faces individuals who reside in a same-sex
marriage state but later leave to reside in a state that does not
recognize same-sex marriage. While the two scenarios are factually
distinguishable, the issue this article considers is federal recognition
of marriage, not state recognition. Thus, the benefits at issue depend
on the couple's federal citizenship, not state citizenship." Windsor's
Fifth Amendment equality language and focus on a unitary approach
to marriage suggests the Supreme Court will ultimately adopt the lex
loci celebrationis definition for federal marriage purposes.
56. Because same-sex couples are not criminally prohibited from participating in a
legal marriage in any state, these marriages should be assessed under the constitutional
right to travel rather than the conflicts of law principle governing evasive marriages.
57. Again, as this article does not consider bigamous, incestuous or polygamous
opposite-sex marraiges as valid marriages due to the unbroken chain of cases holding such
marriages invalid, any attempt to equate same-sex marriages-which are increasingly
receiving legal sanction at both the state and federal level-with bigamous, incestuous, or
polygamous marriages ignores consistent legal precedent. See e.g., Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (unanimous opinion).
58. This author strongly believes that because the issue of federal recognition runs
parallel to state recognition issues, the evasive marriage exceptions under traditional
conflicts of law scenarios are inapplicable. Instead, the question-at the federal level-
should be whether the federal government treats its married citizens similarly for federal
marriage purposes. Whether those individuals partook of migratory or evasive weddings
should only come in to play if the evasive marriage is criminally proscribed, not merely
morally opposed. Same-sex marriage, in contrast to polygamy and incestuous marriages,
is not criminal in any state.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 41:154
Fall 2013] SOMETHING TO [LEX LOC1] CELEBRA TIONIS?
II. Lex Loci Celebrationis
Problems arise in a federal system if one is both
married and unmarried at the same time.
The United States generally applies the notion of lex loci
celebrationis to assess the legality of international marriages." So,
too, do many of the individual states.6' Lex loci celebrationis is the
Latin phrase for "the place-of-celebration" rule. Under the place-of-
celebration rule, marriages that were legal where originally
celebrated will be recognized in another jurisdiction, even if this
different jurisdiction does not permit the celebration of the marriage.
This approach provides a clear delineation of who is married
regardless of where they travel, work, vacation or live. If a marriage
is legally valid where it was performed, lex loci celebrationis demands
that the marriage be recognized as legally valid everywhere else.
The First Restatement on Conflicts of Laws adopted lex loci
celebrationis as the preferred method for determining the validity of
marriages, while reserving a state's right to reject evasive marriages,
or those marriages where couples went to another state to avoid their
home state's rules.62 As one author noted:
Also, likewise under lex celebrationis, a forum
court could decline to recognize a marriage when one
or both of the spouses temporarily traveled to another
state in order to evade a domestic law that would bar
their marriage. The Restatement (First) Section 132
accomplishes this by providing that "a marriage which
is against the law of the domcil [sic] of either party,
though the requirements of the place of the
celebration have been complied with, will be invalid."63
59. See Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the
Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 36 (2005).
60. Wardle, supra note 2, at 166.
61. See e.g., Obergefell v. Kasich, 1:13-CV-501 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) (finding that
Ohio's traditional application of "the place of celebration" rule required Ohio to
recognize a same-sex marriage that was performed on a tarmac in Maryland).
62. It is important to note, however, that evasive marriages like the one involved in
Loving v. Virginia may be recognized where the only reason to refuse such recognition
would result in a constitutional violation. See id.
63. Maugeri, supra note 20, at 350, citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICr OF
LAWS § 132 (1934).
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The Restatement provides instruction and guidance for resolving
state conflicts of law. The state conflicts-of-law issue is entirely
irrelevant, however, when analyzing marriage for federal purposes.
Our national citizenship ensures that we will be permitted to travel
freely among the many states without impacting our federal rights or
responsibilities.6 ' For example, even if one lives in a state with no
state income tax, that state's approach to state taxes does not relieve
an individual from paying federal taxes. Further, even if a state does
not endorse capital punishment, if an individual commits a federally
eligible capital offense, that individual could be subject to the death
penalty for a crime committed wholly within a state prohibiting
capital punishment.
Americans are privileged to maintain two entirely separate forms
of citizenship-state and federal. The clearest symbols between
state and federal citizenship are passports and driver's licenses. A
passport declares one's national citizenship. That document, and that
citizenship, is extremely difficult to change. In contrast, one's driver's
license provides proof of state citizenship. Unlike national
citizenship, state citizenship is extraordinarily easy to change. In
fact, it is possible to change one's state citizenship as often and as
many times as desired.
The key to Windsor, and the key to lex loci celebrationis from a
federalism perspective, is that the particular marital rights at issue are
federal rights (those attending national citizenship), not state rights
(those that flow from state citizenship). A state loses no sovereign
powers over its citizens when the federal government applies federal
law. This is true whether the issue is taxes, criminal law, or marriage
benefits. Living in a nation of federated states implicates the dual
sovereignty doctrine." An offense against one sovereign may or may
64. An additional shortcoming regarding the conflicts of law issue is raised cogently
by Professor Sanders, who argues for a constitutional right to marital recognition. See
Sanders, supra note 7, at 1445-50.
65. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,
757-58 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969).
66. See, e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 43-45 (1867).
67. See e.g., Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974) (acknowledging that,
for diversity purposes, state citizenship requires only national citizenship and domiciliary
status in that state).
68. The dual sovereignty doctrine is usually applied in the double jeopardy context.
While this author recognizes the distinction between criminal law and marital benefits, the
analogy is useful. See e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); Heath v.
Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985).
56 [Vol. 41:1
Fall 2013] SOMETHING TO [LEX LOCI] CELEBRA TIONIS?
not be an offense against the other. Likewise, a benefit afforded by
one sovereign need not be afforded by the other. This is federalism-
a series of national burdens and benefits attending our national
citizenship that operate independently of state legislatures and
governments.69
But, unlike the dilemma faced between equal sovereigns (or
between equal states), the federal government has a unique and
enduring relationship with each American citizen.' Thus, while there
may be a valid reason for competing states to individually assess their
conflicts-of-law rules to determine which state has the superior right
to impose its law, there is no similar reason for the national
government. Because the national government is never put in a
competing position with a state, there is no reason to use the
Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law's "most significant contacts
approach" because one will always be a United States citizen
wherever he or she travels or resides. Quite simply, the issue of who
receives federal marriage benefits transcends state boundaries.
A modern and fluctuating conflicts-of-law approach that
attempts to connect an individual's federal marriage benefits to the
state having the most significant contacts loses sight of the two distinct
forms of citizenship-state and federal. A person remains an
American citizen regardless of which state he or she lives in, travels
to, moves to, flees from, or passes through. The strength of an
individual's federal rights does not depend on the individual's
location in a particular state. The right to receive federal Social
Security benefits is as valid in Hawaii as it is in Idaho. The obligation
to register for the Selective Service is as mandatory in Montana as it
is in Massachusetts. In short, the nation's laws know nothing of state
borders.
Lex loci celebrationis is the most consistent approach the federal
government could apply towards the recognition of same-sex
69. Cf., Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1468, 1478 (2007) (observing that "[s]ome national umpire over interstate
relations is essential to ensure union. This imperative follows from the dual governmental
structure of our constitutional system.").
70. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 22 (U.S. June 26, 2013) (noting
"Among the over 1,000 statutes and numerous federal regulations that DOMA controls
are laws pertaining to Social Security, housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright, and
veterans' benefits." These benefits are entirely distinct from state benefits relating to
housing, taxes and property distribution.).
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marriage.7 ' Any other approach will revert back to the "tiered-
approach" to marriage benefits that the Windsor majority found
constitutionally offensive.72 Ours is a transient nation with individuals
living in many states and locations during their lifetime. To think that
marriage, for federal purposes, evaporates at the state border is
antithetical to federal citizenship. All persons should be able to trust
that their marriage, if legal at inception, will remain legal throughout
the life of the marriage.73
Reviewing courts should adopt the lex loci celebrationis standard
for determining the application of federal marriage benefits. Windsor
confirms that the federal government already relies upon lex loci
celebrationis to assess other marriages, such as common law marriages
or varying age and consanguinity restrictions.4 While scholars and
legislators may strive to differentiate the specific issue in Windsor
from the broader question of what qualifies as a federal marriage,
such factual distinctions are insufficient to justify a departure from lex
loci celebrationis. Further, unlike incestuous or bigamous marriages,
same-sex marriages do not contain any element of criminal conduct
and are thus less likely to pose a threat to federal public policy.76
71. Id. at 15 (noting that "when the Federal Government acts in the exercise of its
own proper authority, it has a wide choice of the mechanisms and means to adopt"). See
also Sanders, surpa note 7, at 1434 (noting that "[i]t is a longstanding matter of legal and
social practice that '[o]rdinarily, marriages that are valid where they are celebrated are
valid everywhere, for all purposes.' Common law commentators, modem conflicts
authorities, and courts at all levels have agreed that it is in everyone's interests-married
individuals, society, and the interstate system-for states to recognize each other's
marriages").
72. Windsor, slip op. at 22-23.
73. Singer, supra note 57, at 13-19, 23-25. Professor Singer does an exceptional job
of pointing out not only the rights, but also the obligations that attend marriage. Were
same-sex marriages to avoid recognition, the partners to such marriages could simply opt
out of their marriage without state sanction (i.e., divorce) simply by relocating.
Withholding federal recognition would give broader marriage rights to same-sex couples
while also opening up such couples to unique risks not faced by their opposite-sex
colleagues.
74. Windsor, slip op. at 18 (observing that the marital age of consent varies among
the states-the minimum age is 13 in New Hampshire-yet 16 in Vermont). Windsor also
speaks about the oft-mocked right to marry one's cousin, available in most states.
75. The Supreme Court's proscription against polygamy is well established. See
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-66 (1879).
76. Singer, supra note 57, at 30. "Same sex relationships used to be criminalized, but
they have not been criminalized in many states for a long time and after Lawrence v. Texas
it is unconstitutional to do so. Other void marriages that violate fundamental public
policies remain criminal, such as incestuous and bigamist marriages."
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Initially, Windsor and her spouse qualified as individuals evading
domestic federal law to benefit from the laws of a more progressive
international location where same-sex marriage was legal. The pair
fled to Canada to marry when they realized that Thea Speyer,
Windsor's eventual spouse, was terminally ill. To preserve the assets
accumulated over four decades together, the pair traveled to Canada
to solemnize their union in legal marriage. At the time of this trip,
New York did not recognize same-sex marriages. Thus, under the
First Restatement, the Windsor marriage was not legal. Fortunately
for this couple, however, the law in New York changed. Windsor
became an easy case only because their home state of New York
eventually recognized same-sex marriages as legal. Thus, the couple's
marriage was legal both at the time of marriage and in their place of
domicile. But, if courts wait for further states to change its laws,
pseudo-married couples (or, couples currently considered married in
14 jurisdictions) will find their federal status entirely dependent on
state residency. This is nonsensical. National citizenship and the
benefits such citizenship yields should not, in any way, be dependent
on state borders. All Americans should equally receive the benefits
of national citizenship.
Windsor's larger message, discernible even through its carefully
cabined language, precludes differing tiers of marriages for federal
law purposes." Federal benefits should be based on federal law."
Thus, the federal interpretation of marriage benefits should be
determined under the lex loci celebrationis concept. Opposite-sex
marriages receive lex loci celebrationis treatment, regardless of
whether the marriage is legal in the place of domicile. If "destination
weddings" are federally recognized for opposite-sex couples that
travel to Toronto, Canada, or New York City to marry, then the same
federal consideration should be given to same-sex couples that make
the exact same journey. Anything less would appear to be a violation,
under Windsor's governing principles, of the Fifth Amendment's
77. Windsor, slip op. at 22-23 ("1... DOMA undermines both the public and private
significance of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; for it tells those couples, and all the
world, that their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal recognition." (emphasis
added)).
78. Id. at 20 ("DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing
and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive same-sex couples of
the benefits and responsibilities that come with the federal recognition of their
marriage.").
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implicit equal protection guarantee," if not other constitutional
provisions."
III. Constitutional Implications Following Windsor
The constitutional "right to marry" has always
been murky. Although the Supreme Court has said the
right is "fundamental," it has also hedged its position by
giving a wide berth to state interests, explaining that
"reasonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship may legitimately be imposed." But the
Court has not explained what makes a marriage-entry
regulation "reasonable," or how we can tell when it
"significantly interfere[s] with" the ability to enter
marriage. Moreover, in the small number of marriages
cases they have decided, the Justices "have drawn on
both due process and equal protection rationales,
sometimes alternating between them, sometimes relying
on both, and sometimes explicitly invoking neither,"
with the result that "both the rationale for [the
fundamental right to marry] and its structure have
remained unclear."8'
79. Id. at 22 (acknowledging that DOMA's purpose was to ignore more liberal state
laws embracing same-sex unions, ensuring "those unions will be treated as second-class
marriages for purposes of federal law) (emphasis added).
80. Singer, supra note 57, at 35. Professor Singer agrees that there appears some
constitutional basis for recognizing same-sex marriages that cross state borders:
In my view, there are two strong arguments for requiring
recognition of same sex marriages under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. The first argument is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
must be construed in light of other constitutional norms, including
those underlying the Commerce Clause, the constitutional right to
travel, the Takings Clause, the First Amendment, and the fundamental
right to marry. Even if none of these clauses or constitutional rights is
sufficient in itself to impose a rigid place of celebration rule, the
combination is arguably powerful.
My thesis differs, slightly, from Professor Singer's as I am analyzing the more limited right
of federal recognition of same-sex marriages. In contrast, Professor Singer's exceptional
article addresses state recognition of other states' same-sex marriages. Hence, this article
need not address the Full Faith and Credit Clause as the thesis is limited to why the
federal government should be recognizing same-sex marriages only as they relate to
federal law.
81. Sanders, supra note 7, at 1448.
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There are at least two potential constitutional claims entitling
same-sex couples to demand their valid state marriages receive
federal recognition following Windsor. First, as Justice Kennedy
suggests in Windsor, couples may have an equal protection claim
under the Fifth Amendment.' Second, couples may rely on the
constitutionally recognized "right to travel," which grants Americans
the right to travel freely between states without suffering financial or
other legal injury. Under both Fifth Amendment equal protection
and the constitutional right to travel, same-sex marriages should
receive federal recognition if they are legal at the time and in the
location they are performed. Windsor implies such recognition,
13arising from national citizenship, is mandated for federal purposes.
A. Fifth Amendment Equal Protection
The Fifth Amendment contains no textual right to equal
protection." Rather, the Supreme Court has read an equal protection
component into the Fifth Amendment where legislative classifications
have been drawn that burden some groups, but not others." For
example, in Davis v. Passman, the Supreme Court noted that:
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
82. Windsor, slip op. at 22-26.
83. It bears mentioning that the majority opinion is either craftily or carelessly
written. At times, the majority speaks of "a State," using a more generic reference to any
of the fourteen jurisdictions recognizing same-sex marriage, and "the State," which seems
much more specific as to New York and its residents, within the same paragraph. See id.
at 25. Finally, in limiting the reach of Windsor, or attempting to do so, Justice Kennedy
concludes the majority opinion by remarking that "[t]his opinion and its holding are
confined to those lawful marriages," without clearly identifying which lawful marriages he
includes. See id. at 26. Are all marriages performed within a same-sex recognition state
valid? Or, are only marriages that are performed in a same-sex recognition state while
simultaneously domiciled in the state valid? As discussed previously within this article,
Ms. Windsor and her spouse partook of an "evasive" wedding by leaving New York to
find a more receptive laws in Canada. Only because New York subsequently changed its
laws does Windsor become a situation where the marriage was legal where performed (but
not legal at the time of marriage where domiciled) and, thereafter, legal where domiciled.
Such fine distinctions provide another reason to adopt the lex loci celebrationis approach.
Otherwise, in the most literal sense, timing will become everything for legally married
same-sex couples.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
85. See Chester James Antieau, Equal Protection Outside the Clause, 40 CALIF. L.
REv. 362, 362-63 (1952).
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without due process of law." In numerous decisions,
this Court "has held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment forbids the Federal
Government to deny equal protection of the laws.
E.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U. S. 88, 100
(1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 93 (1976);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 638 n. 2
(1975); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U. S. 497, 500 (1954)."'
The Court then explained that in all such federal equal
protection cases, courts must apply the requisite level of equal
protection scrutiny afforded the particular classification at issue. In
Passman, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny because the issue
was about gender.' Following Romer, Lawrence and Windsor, the
level of scrutiny that should be applied to same-sex marriages is
unclear and uncertain. Much litigation is sure to attend this issue.
The issue for federal "equal protection," however, is better
defined. Chief Justice Warren reminded in Bolling v. Sharpe that:
[a]lthough the Court has not assumed to define
"liberty" with any great precision, that term is not
confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint.
Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct
which the individual is free to pursue, and it cannot be
restricted except for a proper governmental
objective.""
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Windsor confirms that
"[t]he liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any
person the equal protection of the laws."'
Thus, under the Fifth Amendment, the question becomes: What
"proper governmental objective" could be advanced that allows
same-sex marriages to qualify for federal marital benefits according to
vacillating definitions under state law? What "proper governmental
86. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234 (1979) (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,
95 n.1 (1979).
87. Passman, 442 U.S. at 234-35.
88. Id.
89. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499-500 (1954).
90. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 25 (U.S. June 26, 2013).
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objective" applies to couples who are legally married in New York,
lose their marital status upon leaving New York, and regain their
marital status when traveling in California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia?
The absurdity of a system that defines the scope of one's federal
benefits based on one's physical location lacks a rational basis.
Further, Windsor unequivocally struck down DOMA's federal
definition of marriage as being solely between one man and one
woman. Now, at least for federal purposes, marriage cannot be so
narrowly circumscribed. Windsor criticized DOMA and the federal
government for singling out a class of persons for unequal treatment
"by refusing to acknowledge a status the State finds to be dignified
and proper."9' That status should not change based on any future
relocation of the couple.
Equally troubling is that one's marital status no longer depends
on whether one is legally married, but rather on where you are
currently located or living. As mentioned above, this is akin to Social
Security or veterans' benefits accruing or terminating based on
whether one is currently located in Texas or Massachusetts. A
surgery at the VA Hospital may be covered in Delaware, but not in
Idaho. One may qualify for federal death benefits and tax
exemptions while located in Iowa, but not in New Jersey. What valid
federal governmental objective allows the states to define the
parameters of federal benefits?
Justice Kennedy recognized the shortcomings in this approach,
noting:
[DOMA's] demonstrated purpose is to ensure
that if any State decides to recognize same-sex
marriages, those unions will be treated as second-class
marriages for purposes of federal law. This raises a
most serious question under the Constitution's Fifth
Amendment ...
... DOMA writes inequality into the entire United
States Code. The particular case at hand concerns the
estate tax, but DOMA is more than a simple
determination of what should or should not be allowed
as an estate tax refund. Among the over 1,000 statutes
91. Id. at 25.
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and numerous federal regulations that DOMA
controls are laws pertaining to Social Security,
housing, taxes, criminal sanctions, copyright and
veterans' benefits.
DOMA's principal effect is to identify a subset of
state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal.
The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for
other reasons like governmental efficiency.
Using the majority's language, no level of constitutional scrutiny
would allow the federal government to subject federal marital status
to fluid state definitions, particularly when those definitions and anti-
recognition laws-like the definition struck down in Windsor-are
based unequivocally on the desire "to impose inequality."' No
reasonable governmental objective can be advanced "[b]y seeking to
displace [federal] protection and treating these persons as living in
marriages less respected than others [because doing so violates] the
Fifth Amendment." 94
B. The Constitutional Right to Travel
A second basis for providing federal marriage benefits to all
legally married same-sex couples is the constitutional "right to
travel."" The Constitution protects an individual's right to travel,
though this right has never been clearly defined." The right to travel
has been deemed "a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot
be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment."" The origins of this right, though not enumerated in
the Constitution, stem directly from the Magna Carta." In 1958, the
92. Id. at 22.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 26.
95. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-58 (1966) ("The constitutional right to
travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other
instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to
the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and
repeatedly recognized.").
96. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) ("We have no occasion to
ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional
provision.").
97. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958).
98. Id. at 125-126.
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Supreme Court observed that, "[f]reedom of movement across
frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as well, was a part of
our heritage. Travel abroad, like travel within the country, may be
necessary for a livelihood. It may be as close to the heart of the
individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads. Freedom
of movement is basic in our scheme of values."9
Justice Brennan echoed this sentiment in Shapiro v. Thompson
explaining:
This Court long ago recognized that the nature of
our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of
personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be
free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our
land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations
which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement.
That proposition was early stated by Chief Justice
Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283. 492 (1849):
"For all the great purposes for which the Federal
government was formed, we are one people, with one
common country. We are all citizens of the United
States; and, as members of the same community, must
have the right to pass and repass through every part of
it without interruption, as freely as in our own
States."'oo
The recognition of one's marriage is important while traveling
from state to state. How could anyone argue that the uncertainty of
one's marital status does not impermissibly "burden or restrict"
movement?o' Increasingly, we are becoming a migratory and
transient society. We travel more than our ancestors, and
exponentially more than the Founders. Many Americans move to
different states during their lives and may even regularly work in
more than one state. It is no longer peculiar to learn that someone
lives in one state and works in a nearby state. Our society is
decidedly more mobile than earlier generations.
But, does the right to travel include federal protection for
individuals seeking marital recognition? Can the constitutional right
99. Id. at 126.
100. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 629-30.
101. Id
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to travel ensure that individuals married in one state will continue to
carry that marital status with them if they return home or decide to
find a new home? The critical distinction that this article draws-and
the line demarcated in Windsor-is between federal and state
recognition of marriage. At present, Texas is permitted to deny that
two women are married for state law purposes. Does that mean that
Texas, or any other state, may impose its provincial laws on the
federal government when the federal government assesses marriage
for the purpose of allocating the over 1,000 benefits that are based on
marital status? This author believes not. Windsor and the
constitutionally recognized right to travel precludes such
overreaching by states that do not recognize same-sex marriage.
If state law dictates which individuals are married for federal
purposes, some states will wield more power than others. Windsor
found that conscientious objectors to same-sex marriage, whether
state or federal, should not be permitted to differentiate between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples for federal marriage purposes
because such "differentiation demeans the couple, whose moral and
sexual choices the Constitution protects, and whose relationship
[some states] have sought to dignify."a' Allowing states to force their
will upon the minority of states that have embraced same-sex
marriage for federal law purposes violates the fundamental right to
travel. Worse still, such approach convolutes the individual's right to
maintain separate state and federal citizenships. If states opposing
same-sex marriage are permitted to impose their will in an
extraterritorial fashion upon individuals exercising their fundamental
right to travel, then the Supreme Court's dismantlement of DOMA
will be limited to a select minority of states.
This article has briefly attempted to shape the arguments in favor
of adopting the lex loci celebrationis approach to federal marriage
recognition. This doctrine preserves federalism by permitting states
to retain their inherent domestic power to regulate marriages within
their borders under state law. The issue is of constitutional
magnitude and cannot be resolved simply by allowing the separate
federal agencies to periodically and in piecemeal fashion articulate
their respective approaches to discerning who is married for federal
purposes. Marriage implicates over 1,000 federal benefits and
burdens. It is these federal benefits and burdens that merit
constitutional protection. While a constitutional right to same-sex
102. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307, slip op. at 23 (U.S. June 26,2013).
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marriage is inevitable, the more immediate concern is
constitutionalizing federal recognition of all legally valid same-sex
marriages for federal law purposes. The tone, language and clear
trajectory of Windsor lends itself to no other conclusion.
Conclusion: Let them Eat Cake!
The Supreme Court declared marriage a
fundamental right more than forty years ago. The
argument that the right to marry includes same-sex
couples has been advanced in recent state and federal
litigation, but the question is one that even many
thoughtful supporters argue the Court should not and
will not settle in the very near future. A separate right
of marriage recognition, if advanced in federal
litigation, would alleviate an urgent problem while
allowing the political and legal debates over same-sex
marriage to continue. It would recognize, in a spirit of
laboratories of democracy-style federalism, that states
"should intensely compete to show that [one view of
marriage] is more reasonable than the other," while
simultaneously recognizing that states should not be
allowed to "inflict serious harm" on couples who are
already married "in order to make a purely symbolic
point.""o
As Professor Sanders articulates, the most pressing issue facing
our federal government right now is not whether same-sex marriage
should be constitutionally mandated, but rather whether legally valid
same-sex marriage should be constitutionally recognized across state
lines. This is the most urgent question for thousands of same-sex
couples that are now legally married under the laws of one of the
thirteen states (and District of Columbia) that has legalized same-sex
marriage. These individuals took legal steps to enter marriage and
should not lose that status simply by moving, or returning home, to a
state that does not recognize same-sex marriage.'4
103. Sanders, supra note 7, at 1425-26.
104. See Singer, supra note 57, at 13-19, 23-25.
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The question posed herein is quite narrow: Should the federal
government recognize legal same-sex marriages, wherever performed,
for purposes of federal benefits and burdens? Following Windsor, the
answer appears to be a subdued "yes." As Professor Sanders
observes:
The right of marriage recognition would be a
modest, carefully tailored solution to a pressing
problem of interstate relations and human dignity. It
would not force any state to create a marriage of
which it disapproves, or allow any couple to evade
their own state's marriage laws.' 5o
Marriage recognition by the federal government is a small, but
necessary, step in the march towards marriage equality. Federal
recognition of all legally performed same-sex marriages, regardless of
a couple's domicile, ensures that all Americans receive the full-and
equal-benefits of their federal citizenship. Applying lex loci
celebrationis furthers both the liberty and equality protections
identified in Windsor.
Further, extending federal marital benefits to the Texas couple
traveling to New York should not be dependent on the gender of the
couple. Were there to be such fluctuation in the receipt of federal
benefits, another possible violation would occur under the
constitutionally recognized right to travel:" Opposite-sex couples-
but not same-sex couples-could partake in a "destination wedding"
and still receive federal benefits." There appears no rational basis
for federally drawing the line at a state's border.'" If DOMA's
federal definition of marriage is unconstitutional for legally married
citizens in New York, then so, too, must that definition be
unconstitutional for American citizens living in Texas or Oklahoma.
To tread down a different path, if the receipt of federal marital
benefits were to depend on one's state residency, it would result in
the very chaos and vast expenditures that Justice Kennedy sought to
105. Sanders, supra note 7, at 1426.
106. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,629-31 (1969).
107. See Windsor, slip op. at 25 ("DOMA instructs all federal officials... that [one
type of marriage] is less worthy than the marriages of others."). Such language appears to
be the natural predicate for equal federal treatment of all legal marriages performed in an
individual state.
108. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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avoid in Windsor.'" And, one should not forget that Richard and
Mildred Loving themselves had an evasive wedding when they
purposefully left Virginia to be wed in the more hospitable territory
of District of Columbia.no Fortunately for the Lovings, and all racial
minorities, the Supreme Court issued a forceful recognition of their
union when the question first came before the Court."' Same-sex
couples must wait a bit longer for their full inclusion. But, until that
moment comes, same-sex marriages should not be evaluated under
traditional conflicts of law provisions governing evasive marriages.
Unlike the Lovings, who were persecuted under detestable and
odious anti-miscegenation laws, same-sex couples commit no crime
when they travel to another state to marry."' These marriages may be
repulsive to some, but they are not criminal.
Ultimately, Windsor is a case about federal power, federal
benefits and federal law. Thus, the Supreme Court acted well within
its discretion to legally determine which marriages qualify for federal
benefits under federal law. And, while Justice Scalia and Alito
properly criticize Justice Kennedy and the majority's untethered
opinion"'-is this an equal protection case or a substantive due
process case?" 4-this author focuses on the more pressing and
enduring concerns of marital recognition. Who is married in the eyes
of our federal government? How will the federal government resolve
the "destination wedding" question? Will the federal government
give a different interpretation to the relocation question? And, how
long before we have a case that will provide a definitive answer to
these questions? Justice Scalia forecasts one year."' For the many
same-sex couples whose legal status regarding their marriage remains
in flux, the wait will be intolerable. Are they married? Or, does their
109. Windsor, slip op. at 11.
110. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
111. Id.
112. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding the State of
Georgia's right to withdraw an offer of employment to a lesbian because her "marriage"-
something the Eleventh Circuit places in quotes to emphasize its nonrecognition-
involved legal conduct, sodomy, at the time under the then-governing law of Bowers v.
Hardwick).
113. Windsor, slip op. at 7-17 (Alito, J., dissenting).
114. Id. Justice Alito fairly suggests that, "[p]erhaps because they cannot show that
same-sex marriage is a fundamental right under our Constitution, Windsor and the United
States couch their arguments in equal protection terms." Id. at 10. But, ultimately, the
Court's majority fails to resolve this question or clearly define on what basis the decision is
being rendered.
115. Windsor, slip op. at 16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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marriage literally "come and go" depending on where they live or
travel? Perhaps married in New York (where one lives), but not
married in New Jersey (where one works).
We have but one federal government. And, under that one
federal government, all legal marriages should be treated the same.
Windsor provides a glimmer of hope that all legally valid marriages
will be viewed the same under federal law. If this holds true, then,
finally, same-sex couples will have something uniquely American to
lex loci celebrationis: "With liberty and justice for all."
